The consensus among economists is that China's post-1978 market reform policies have produced one of the world's greatest economic success stories. Some progressives believe that China is now capable of serving as an anchor for a new (non-U.S. dominated) global economy. A few claim that the reform experience demonstrates the workability (and desirability) of market socialism. This article is critical of these views. Its four main conclusions are as follows: first, the reforms have led to the restoration of capitalism, not a new form of market socialism. Second, the gains attributed to the reforms have been seriously overstated. Early successes were largely due to the economic foundation established during the pre-reform Mao era. Moreover, the reform process has begun to undermine this foundation, increasing the country's dependence on foreign investment, technology, and markets. Third, the reforms have produced an increasingly exploitative growth process, one that generates considerable wealth for a minority at unacceptably high cost for the majority. Finally, the reforms also produced a growth process whose logic led it to become enmeshed in, and dependent upon, a broader process of transnational restructuring, one controlled by transnational capital. As a result, China is not only incapable of serving as an anchor for an alternative global economy, its accumulation dynamics actually contribute to the strengthening of existing structures of power and the global imbalances and tensions they generate.
Introduction
The consensus among economists is that China's post-1978 market reform policies have produced one of the world's greatest economic success stories. In a representative statement, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) notes that:
The pace of economic change in China has been extremely rapid since the start of economic reforms just over 25 years ago. Economic growth has averaged 9½ per cent over the past two decades and seems likely to continue at that pace for some time. Such an increase in output represents one of the most sustained and rapid economic transformations seen in the world economy in the past 50 years. (OECD 2005: 16) Significantly, many progressive economists share this positive view of the Chinese reform experience. In fact, as the U.S. economy shows increasing signs of structural weakness, a growing number believe that we may be witnessing the collapse of the U.S. dominated international economic order and its replacement with a new, more progressive one anchored by China. As evidence, many point to the Chinese government's stated commitment to socialism and the fact that the country's industrial activity generates a demand for imported inputs (manufactured goods from East Asia and primary commodities from Latin America and Africa) that appears capable of supporting economic growth throughout much of the third world.
It would be nice if this view of China was accurate. Unfortunately, as I argue below, it is not. First, regardless of what Chinese leaders say, China is not pioneering a new form of market socialism-rather capitalism has been restored in China. As a result, Chinese internal dynamics are clearly hostile to the creation of any anti-capitalist alternative.
_______________________
Author's note: Many of the arguments presented in this paper were developed jointly with Paul Burkett. I also want to thank him for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft. Second, the economic gains attributed to China's post-1978 market reforms have been seriously overstated. China's early post-reform successes were largely due to the economic foundation established during the pre-reform Mao era. Moreover, over time, the reform process has begun to undermine this foundation, increasing the country's dependence on foreign investment, technology, and markets. Third, and more importantly, the economic reforms have created an increasingly exploitative growth process, one that is producing considerable wealth for a minority at unacceptably high cost for the great majority of Chinese working people.
Finally, China's economic experience cannot be understood in isolation from the broader dynamics of global capitalism. The Chinese accumulation process has become structurally enmeshed in, and dependent upon, the operation of the transnational corporate controlled production networks that largely shape these dynamics. As a result, China is not only incapable of serving as an anchor for an alternative global economy, its accumulation dynamics actually contribute to the strengthening of existing structures of power and the global imbalances and tensions they generate.
Structural Transformation
The Chinese government introduced a series of reforms beginning in 1978 which gradually privileged market dynamics over planning, private ownership over public ownership, and foreign enterprises and markets over domestic ones.
1 It claims that these reforms have been responsible for the country's rapid and sustained economic growth-and that this growth demonstrates the success of a new form of socialism, what it calls market socialism.
The reforms have indeed transformed the Chinese economy. For example, transactions are now predominantly shaped by market determined prices. As Table 1 shows, the share of retail transactions in which prices were set by the state fell from 97 percent in 1978 to 2.6 percent in 2003. Perhaps more significantly, the share of producer goods transactions in which prices were fixed by the state fell from 100 percent in 1978 to 10 percent in 2003.
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Equally clear is the growing dominance of the private sector in industry (see Table 2 ). In 1978, state owned enterprises accounted for 100 percent of all industrial value added in the Chinese economy.
By 1998 the state share had fallen to 54.8 percent. By 2003 it had fallen still further to 41.9 percent.
However, even these declining percentages overstate the contribution of the state sector.
Recognizing that many state enterprises are now jointly owned by private interests-either as part of a joint venture or through stock ownership-the OECD has classified state firms as either directly or indirectly controlled depending on whether the state share of paid-in capital is greater than 50 percent of the total. As Table 2 illustrates, the contribution of directly controlled state enterprises to industrial value added fell from 38.9 percent in 1998 to 22.9 percent in 2003 (thus accounting for less than a quarter of total industrial value added). Over this same five year period, the private sector share rose from 27.9 percent to 52.3 percent.
If we focus just on the manufacturing sector (one component of the industrial sector which also includes mining and utilities), the declining strategic importance of the state sector becomes even clearer.
The OECD has divided China's manufacturing sector into two groups. The first includes 5 industries that continue to be dominated by state enterprises: petroleum processing and coking, smelting and pressing of ferrous metals, smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metals, tobacco processing, and transport equipment (OECD 2005: 119) .
The second and larger group (which accounts for over 75 percent of manufacturing value added) is made up of 23 different manufacturing industries, including food processing, textiles, garments, chemicals, medical and pharmaceuticals, plastics, ordinary machinery, special purpose machinery, electrical equipment, and electronic and telecom equipment. These industries are now dominated by private, and increasingly foreign, enterprises (OECD 2005: 133-4) . As the OECD explains:
In 1998 the private sector produced the higher share of value added in only 5 out of these 23 . . . manufacturing industries. By 2003, this was true for all 23 of these industries. Moreover, in half of them, private firms produced more than three-quarters of output. Overall in these 23 industries, the private sector employs two-thirds of the labor force, produces two-thirds of these industries' value added and accounts for over 90 percent of their exports. (OECD 2005: 82) The Electronic and Telecom Equipment industry offers an important illustration of recent developments. Its share of overall industrial value added rose from 6.4 percent in 1998 to 9.5 percent in 2003, making it the single largest contributor. But, as Table 3 illustrates, this rise is largely the result of foreign controlled activity. The foreign share of value added rose from 38 percent to 58 percent while the state share (direct and indirect) fell from 45 percent to 25 percent. Since this industry is one of China's leading growth centers, this trend strongly suggests that the state's share, and even the nationally controlled share of value added, is destined to continue to decline.
State enterprises do remain important and the Chinese state still dominates critical sectors of the economy, but these areas of strength are now largely outside the core industrial sector. In 2006, the total assets of the approximately 160 largest "state owned monopolies and oligopolies amounted to a stunning 12.20 trillion yuan ($1.6 trillion) or about 57 percent of the country's gross domestic product" (Lam 2007 ).
However, half of the earnings of this group were generated by three large oil enterprises. In fact, "Up to 80
percent of the year-on-year increase in profits realized in 2006 by all Chinese enterprises were attributable to . . . monopoly financial groups or monopoly firms in the areas of oil and petrochemicals, electricity, coal and metals" (Lam 2007 ).
The reform process has also greatly strengthened the role of foreign capital. (Whalley and Xin 2006: 6; Miller 2006) . Moreover, a growing percentage of these foreign produced exports are now being produced by 100 percent foreign owned firms. For example, the share of China's computer related exports produced by 100 percent foreign owned firms increased from 51 to 75 percent over the period 1993-2003 (see Table 4 ). As a result of these trends, the ratio of exports to GDP has steadily climbed from 16 percent in 1990 to over 40 percent in 2006 (Asian Development Bank 2007a: PRC Country Table) .
In sum, while state planners and enterprises continue to play an important role in China's economy, state power has been used to shape an accumulation process that is now dominated by privately-owned, profit-seeking firms, and led by foreign transnational corporations, whose production is largely aimed at markets in other (mostly advanced capitalist) countries. Regardless of how one might evaluate the performance of the Chinese economy, it is hard to imagine how this development can be viewed as laying the foundation for an alternative to capitalism, at either national or international levels. Rather it points to the conclusion that capitalism itself has been restored in China (an argument further developed below). I disagree with this claim. One reason is that it incorrectly implies that marketization, privatization, and deregulation were necessary to lift China out of technological backwardness. The Chinese government's assertion that Mao-era policies were an economic disaster is often cited as support for this mistaken view. The truth is that while the Chinese economy suffered from economic problems at the close of the Mao era (including over-centralization of decision-making and an overemphasis on heavy industry at the expense of other sectors of the economy), state planning and production recorded many outstanding achievements as well. There is reason to believe that the government was preparing to adjust its planning priorities to address this problem. Nixon visited China in 1972, leading to a dramatic improvement in relations between the United States and the PRC. "Soon after, China launched the 'Four-modernization Plan' (i.e.
modernization of industry, agriculture, science and technology, and defense) in 1974, indicating a shift of economic priorities from single-minded military and heavy industrial build-up to raising the living standards of ordinary citizens" (Lu 2000: 7) . In other words, once the Chinese government no longer felt threatened by the United States, it launched a new initiative that was designed, among other things, to encourage research directed at improving the quality and diversity of consumer goods.
Of course, it is impossible to know whether this initiative would have succeeded. Mao died in 1976 and soon after the new leadership of the Communist Party launched its reform program dismantling the country's existing political-economy. 5 However, what is relevant for our discussion here is the fact that China had a strong national research and development infrastructure in place before the start of the reform period. Said differently, without the prior accomplishments of state planning and production, the market reforms are unlikely to have produced the gains that they did. 4 For example, before 1979, only 27 percent of electronics production was for civilian use (Wong 2006: 66) . 5 It is important to note that the Communist Party's decision to adopt a market oriented reform program was not made in response to mass demands. In that sense it was a rejection of increasingly popular calls for the decentralization and democratization of China's existing production and planning systems (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2005a: Chapter 2).
There is another and more important reason to be critical of the conventional wisdom which celebrates China's market reforms. It is that after a relatively brief period (one to two decades) of economic dynamism stimulated largely by early decentralization initiatives, the reform process is slowly but steadily eroding the country's technological and national development capacities. This is illustrated by the post-reform evolution of China's high-tech industries, especially its computer industry.
Starting in the early 1980s, the Chinese government began reducing the direct funding of its various research institutes with the goal of forcing them to become self-financing. In response, and with government encouragement, these institutes created new, profit-driven enterprises. To enhance their chances of success, these new enterprises were granted managerial independence and, more importantly, free access to the personal and research findings of their parent institutions. Among the most successful of these new science and technology enterprises were four computer companies: Legend (now Lenovo), Founder, Great Wall Computer, and Stone. Lenovo, for example, was started by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (Wong 2006: 67) .
These firms were able to rapidly expand and dominate a domestic computer market for two interrelated reasons. They were able to combine innovations related to Chinese language word processing developed by their parent institutions with foreign purchased hardware and technology to produce affordable computers capable of processing Chinese characters (Lu 2000: 4) . And, they were able to obtain the needed hardware and technology from foreign firms on relatively favorable terms thanks to state policies that restricted the direct access of these firms to the Chinese market (Wong 2006: 68) .
However, in the latter half of the 1990s, pressed by growing banking, inflation, labor, and trade problems, the Chinese government began abandoning its restrictions on foreign access to the domestic market in order to pursue WTO membership (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2005a: Chapter 2). The government hoped that membership would promote greater domestic competition which it viewed as key to "a more rapid and more healthy development of China's national economy" (Branstetter and Lardy 2006: 21).
China's greater international openness has indeed generated more competition, but the results appear far from beneficial for Chinese development. Foreign companies which had previously focused on exports and/or were forced to operate within the structure of joint ventures are now directly targeting the Chinese market with increasingly negative consequences for Chinese high technology producers.
The cell phone industry provides one example: when Samsung entered the Chinese market in the early 1990s it was forced by government licensing requirements to do so as part of a joint venture with a state enterprise, the Kejian Company. Kenjian, like Lenovo, was created by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in 1986. Kenjian relied on Samsung's core technology to produce its phones and also sold selected Samsung phones through its own sales network. For a time, Kejian was even the leading cell phone brand in China. However, with China's accession to the WTO, Samsung was soon freed from its joint venture obligations. It opened its own wholly owned subsidiary and began directly marketing its own products, quickly winning market share largely at Kejian's expense (Wong 2006: 82) .
The situation has only become worse for Chinese firms:
Cell-phone makers TCL and Ningbo Bird have seen their share of the mainland market whittled down by global giants Nokia and Motorola. Profit margins at telecom equipment makers Huawei Technologies and ZTE have shriveled. BOE Technology Group, the country's biggest maker of liquid-crystal displays used as screens for PCs and TVs, has dumped noncore assets to prop up earnings and is lobbying for a government bailout. Chipmakers Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. and Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp., which once hoped to challenge the Taiwanese as world leaders, are limping. "Our greatest challenge is how to turn the company profitable," says Anne Chen, SMIC's Hong Kong representative. (Einhorn 2007: 44) Heightened internal competition is also taking its toll on the Chinese computer industry. Lenovo China's other computer makers (labeled "also-ran computer makers" by Business Week) are in real trouble, including Founder, which used to hold second place in the Chinese market (Einhorn 2008b (Miller 2006) .
Reflecting this reality, eight of China's top 10 exporters are Taiwanese ODMs that supply "branded PC sellers such as Dell with unbranded computers and components" (Miller 2006 ).
China's main contribution to this export activity is cheap land and labor. "There are no Chinese
ODMs and there are no significant Chinese suppliers to the Taiwanese ODMs, or to their suppliers." And it is unlikely that Chinese computer makers will be able to change this situation. As one industry analyst explained: "No, it's too late. All the major global brands rely on Taiwanese companies and suppliers, who control this part of the supply chain. The market is too mature for new players to enter. The only value added by China is the efficiency it brings to the assembly process, not its own technology" (Miller 2006 Perhaps the most important evidence of the failure of the reform process to safeguard China's technology future is that the drive for international competitiveness has led Chinese firms, especially the leading ones, to delink from the national technology grid. George Gilboy highlights this development and its consequences as follows:
In 2002, Chinese firms devoted less than one percent of their total science and technology budgets (which include technology imports, renovation of existing equipment, and R&D) to purchasing domestic technology. China's best firms are among the least connected to domestic suppliers: for every $100 that state-owned electronics and telecom firms spend on technology imports, they spend only $1.20 on similar domestic goods. Thus Chinese technology suppliers do not enjoy a strong "demand pull" from the best domestic firms to stimulate their own innovative capabilities; they are relegated primarily to serving rural enterprises and less competitive state-owned enterprises. (Gilboy 2004) Some Chinese firms, like Lenovo, have already established themselves as major international competitors. No doubt there will be others. But such accomplishments are not an adequate indictor of a successful development policy. A more important indicator is the degree to which a country's national development capacities are strengthened. And, on this measure, China's reform policies (despite claims to the contrary) appear to be a failure. The early gains of the reform period-which were largely made possible by accomplishments in the pre-reform period-have not been sustained. As a result, the Chinese economy is slowly but steadily becoming dependent on foreign technology, production, and markets-a trajectory that bodes ill for Chinese working people.
Destructive Social Consequences
The most important reason to be critical of China's market reform polices is that they have created a growth process underpinned by increasingly brutal working and living conditions for the great majority of
Chinese. Most surprising perhaps is the fact that the country's rapid growth has failed to generate adequate employment. The ILO has divided urban employment into five main categories: employment in traditional formal enterprises such as state and collective enterprises; employment in emerging formal enterprises such as cooperative enterprises, joint ownership enterprises, limited liability corporations, shareholding corporations and foreign-funded enterprises; employment in small-scale private registered enterprises; employment in individual registered businesses, and irregular employment. 6 Table 5 shows the employment trends in these categories over the period 1990-2002.
Perhaps most striking is not the decline in employment in the traditional formal sector, which is a logical consequence of the reform process, but the lack of significant job creation in the "emerging" formal sector. Even with the employment contribution of small and individual private enterprises, the Chinese economy managed an overall increase in "regular" employment of only 1.7 million workers over the entire thirteen year period. 7 This was far from sufficient to match the growth in labor supply. Thus, growing numbers of Chinese workers have been forced to accept employment as irregular workers; with an increase of 80 million over the period 1990-2002, they now comprise the largest single urban employment category.
6 Irregular employment includes casual-wage or self-employment-typically in construction, cleaning and maintenance of premises, retail trade, street vending, repair services, or domestic services. 7 Regular manufacturing employment actually fell over this period, from 53.9 million in 1990 to 37.3 million in 2002 (Ghose 2005: 29 In 2005, the Ministry of Public Security (which oversees the registration system) gave local governments the power to reform the registration system, including if they wished ending the distinction between urban and rural residents. But, local governments have refused to do so. The reason: it would be bad for business. The change would require an increase in spending on social services which would have to be funded by higher or new taxes. Providing a social safety net would also likely enhance migrant worker security, encouraging demands for higher pay and improved working conditions (Wu 2007a ). The American Mercury Club, located on East China's Taihu Lake is one of the largest in China. The club has 144 berths, about 400 registered members and about 30 private yachts. With a membership fee of more than 130,000 yuan (US$15,700), it is not likely that many ordinary people will apply for membership in the club. . . .
The local government is taking steps to encourage the new activity. Shanghai will build five marinas by 2010, at the mouth of the Yangtze River, on Dianshan Lake and along the coastline. The marinas near the downtown will have berths for about 10,000 yachts by 2010. . . . Nanjing, another important city in the Yangtze River Delta, plans to build yachting facilities along its riverfront, including a five-storey complex to be used for yacht exhibitions, conferences and other recreational events.
Southeast China's Xiamen City will build an international yachting centre able to berth 900 yachts. The project will include entertainment facilities and a five-star hotel. (Li 2005) The sentiment of many Communist Party leaders was captured in a magazine article written by Zhou Ruijing (a retired senior newspaper editor). "'A widening gap between rich and poor is not the fault of market reforms,' he wrote. 'It's the natural result of them, which is neither good nor bad, but quite predictable.' He said most of the complaints leading to social unrest, like the high cost of education and medical care, land seizures, pollution and poor public safety, tended to be problems of inefficiency and government corruption, not shortcomings of the market" (Kahn 2006 ).
An obvious reason that many in the leadership of the Communist Party have steadfastly pushed and defended the reform program despite its devastating effects on working people is that they have been some of its biggest beneficiaries. Their ability to shape the reform process and dominate decision-making at key state enterprises and institutions has enabled them to use state assets for personal gain, place family and friends in lucrative positions of authority in both the state and private sector, and ensure that the rapidly growing capitalist class remains dependent on the Party's good will (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2005a:
12 At the same time, the Communist Party has begun a number of reform efforts which are designed to ameliorate the worst excesses generated by China's growth strategy without radically changing its orientation. One example is the 2008 Labor Contract Law. It requires, among other things, that employers provide their workers with a written contract and pay a premium for overtime and weekend work. However, because of loopholes and inadequate enforcement, the law has had limited impact on employment conditions (International Trade Union Confederation 2008).
Chapter 2). This has led to a fusion of party-state-capitalist elites around a shared commitment to continue the advance of a capitalist political economy with "Chinese characteristics." China's elite has been willing to share the fruits of the country's production with international capital--although struggles over distributional issues are growing sharper as international capital strengthens its position within China--because international capital's participation has been critical to the establishment and continued growth of China's new political-economy. However, China's elite appears determined to ensure that they will be the primary national claimant. Thus, at the same time that the 15 It remains to be seen whether such actions will threaten future foreign investment and export production, the two most important pillars of China's growth strategy. Perhaps most noteworthy is the fact that working people have begun openly defending the accomplishments of the Mao period as part of broader discussions and debates over how to renew a genuine effort to build socialism in China (Gao 2008) . Regardless of what happens, it is difficult to see on what basis progressives would want to celebrate and promote China's reform experience.
Transnational Accumulation Dynamics
Given China's size and the enormity of the country's recent policy changes, most analysts have been content to explain China's economic experience largely in terms of national factors, especially state decisions. While understandable, especially given the popularity of the hunt for development models, this framing leads to a misleading understanding of Chinese accumulation dynamics. Among other things, it 14 For example: "From the late 1990s to 2005, the number of individual enterprises [those restricted to a maximum of eight employees] was shrinking at the rate of more than 1.3 million a year. The reasons include the failure to obtain low-interest loans and the ever rising energy and raw material costs" (Lam 2007) . 15 The Chinese government has now halted publication of these protest figures, but most analysts believe that their number continues to rise. Significantly, unrest has also spread to the Chinese military: "For two weeks [beginning in early September 2007] , Chinese authorities have tried to put down a series of coordinated riots by thousands of demobilized soldiers, outraged at the shoddy and expensive training offered them in preparation for return to civilian life. . . . These incidents in cities all over China must be of special concern to the Beijing government, which for years has managed to keep the lid on a growing tide of unrest that sees on average over 250 often-violent protests and demonstrations every day" (Manthorpe 2007). encourages the misguided belief that China can serve as an anchor for a new (non-U.S. dominated) global economy.
The reality is that China's transformation is not occurring in a vacuum or solely in response to
Chinese initiatives. Rather, East Asian economies, including that of China, are being linked and collectively reshaped by broader transnational capitalist dynamics, in particular by the establishment and intensification of cross-border production networks organized by transnational corporations. 16 As a result, China's own accumulation dynamics are increasingly being tied to dominant patterns of investment and trade, thereby reinforcing rather than offering an alternative to them.
One consequence of this reshaping is that all East Asian economies have become more trade Table 6 shows, East Asian trade in manufactures is steadily narrowing to the export and import of parts and components rather than final goods. China is the only country (besides Indonesia) whose exports remain predominantly final goods (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2007: 25) .
These developments reflect China's new position as final production platform in a transnational corporation structured regional production system. As the Asian Development Bank explains, "The PRC has a special role to play. At the center of MNCs' regional supply networks, it is important in boosting both intra-and interregional trade" (Asian Development Bank 2007b: 67) . In other words, the region's growing focus on trade in parts and components is largely a consequence of China's development as an import dependent producer of increasingly high technology exports. China's unique position is highlighted by the fact that it is the only country in the region that runs a regional trade deficit in parts and components.
Thus, the mirror image of China's surplus in trade with the United States and the European Union is its deficit in trade with East Asia (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2006: 12, 15-6) .
The sharp increase in intraregional trade has encouraged many analysts to believe that China's import dependent production will enable East Asian countries (and those in Latin America and Africa that also export to China) to "uncouple" from the U.S. dominated international economic order. However, since this trade activity largely involves an intraregional trade of parts and components culminating in Chinabased production, with final sales directed outside the region (especially to the U.S. and the EU), quite the opposite is true; East Asia's overall dependence on developed capitalist markets has actually grown. As the Asian Development Bank explains, "even though intra-Asian trade has been expanding more rapidly than This regional perspective illuminates that fact that China's market reform strategy, despite its domestic origins, soon became enmeshed in a broader process of transnational restructuring, one that accelerated the reforms in ways guaranteed to ensure the dominance of capitalist imperatives in China. It also enables us to see more clearly the ways in which China's economic dynamism is based on unstable pillars and destructive of working class interests both inside and outside of China.
The most obvious problem is that East Asian growth has become ever more dependent on satisfying market demands outside the region as opposed to national or even regional needs. In particular, as China's economic activity (and thus the region's production) became geared to exporting to the U.S., the result has been ever larger U.S. trade deficits. Since it is doubtful that the U.S. economy can continue to sustain such large and growing trade deficits, it is difficult to see how China (and by extension the other countries in the region) can avoid painful adjustments involving lower rates of growth and a further worsening of majority employment and living conditions.
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Chinese growth dynamics remain problematic even if international trade imbalances can be sustained. For example, China's emersion in transnational cross-border production chains will further complicate Chinese efforts at technological upgrading. As an UNCTAD study points out, "participating in international production chains" often leaves the host country "locked into its current structure of comparative advantage . . . thereby delaying the exploitation of potential comparative advantage in highertech stages of production" (UNCTAD 2002b: 75) . Five years after China's 2001 accession to the WTO, the Chinese economist Han Deqiang recalls that he had "argued the greatest damage [of membership]
would be to China's capacity to control its industrial and technological development autonomously. I think it's safe to say these last five years have more than proven that true. In China, any industry that wants to develop its own technology or markets has encountered increasingly great barriers" (Philion 2007 ).
Some scholars have argued that China is overcoming this limitation, pointing to a recent decline in imports from other East Asian countries as proof that China is successfully developing its own backward production linkages. 19 However, the data does not support this argument. The trade improvement appears to be temporary, reflecting a one-time increase in foreign investment in the garment industry motivated by reduced foreign trade restrictions on Chinese garment exports. More generally, "the idea that the PRC has been able to replace imported supplies with domestic components is not supported by [existing] trends.
The claim that the PRC now provides an important source of demand in final goods markets for other Asian countries also sits ill with the data" (Asian Development Bank 2008a: 23).
Even more problematic is the fact that as China's growth has become dependent on the country's participation in crosscutting and competing transnational production networks, the Chinese state has come under ever greater pressure to keep wages down and productivity up in order to sustain or improve the country's position within these networks. And, because of its key position, Chinese conditions have become the benchmark by which transnational corporations evaluate the investment environment in other countries. As a result, workers throughout East Asia have become pitted against each other in a contest to match the level of labor exploitation achieved in China. 20 Among other things, this "competition" works to reinforce the bias of the system toward exports, thereby also intensifying the risk of regional overproduction. Thus, far from opening up new possibilities for working people, China's reform strategy has actually strengthened a transnational accumulation process that is generating serious national and international imbalances and tensions that will eventually require correction at considerable social cost.
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Conclusion
Tragically, China's post-1978 market reform strategy continues to be celebrated rather uncritically by the great majority of economists, and generally for the same reasons: the country's rapid and sustained growth, ability to attract foreign direct investment, and production of ever more sophisticated exports. For mainstream economists, the Chinese economic experience shows once again the virtues of market liberalization. For many progressives, it demonstrates the virtues of a controlled, state-directed market liberalization process. For some, the Chinese reform experience demonstrates the workability (and superiority) of market socialism.
Unfortunately, a deeper look at the Chinese reform experience challenges this celebration. As highlighted above, China's economic transformation has been driven by a growth process that is now eroding majority living and working conditions as well as national development capacities. This growth process is also contributing to a strengthening of transnational accumulation dynamics that work to intensify competitive pressures on working people throughout East Asia and beyond. 20 Investment rates have been falling in most East Asia countries, in part because national capital has been shifting production to China to take advantage of more profitable production conditions. Foreign direct investment has also declined for a similar reason. In response, governments have implemented new labor regimes designed to weaken labor protections. As a consequence wages and working conditions have worsened throughout the region (Asian Development Bank 2007c: 32-3; HartLandsberg and Burkett 2007: 31-36 . For a case study of Korea see Hart-Landsberg and Burkett (2006: 28-33) . 21 Latin American and African countries supply China with primary commodities rather than manufactured parts and components and thus have a different economic relationship with China than do East Asian countries. China's large and growing need for these commodities has boosted Latin American and African growth and foreign exchange earnings. However, this gain comes at a cost. Trade agreements with China, sometimes supported by Chinese financial assistance, reinforce existing structural imbalances by strengthening the primary commodity sector at the expense of the industrial sector. At the same time, close to 95 percent of all Latin American high technology exports face competition from China-based exporters. These threatened high technology exports represent almost 12 percent of all Latin American exports (Gallagher and Porzecanski 2008: 14; Li 2007) . Africa faces similar dangers (Cheng 2007a ).
The celebration of the Chinese economic experience by those supportive of socialism is especially problematic. Among other things, it encourages the mistaken belief that socialism can be built through the use of markets and a closer integration with global capitalist accumulation dynamics. At a minimum, this leads to confusion about the nature of socialism and of capitalism as well. This is more than a theoretical concern as progressive economists in countries such as Cuba, Venezuela, South Africa, and Brazil debate the merits of adopting the Chinese strategy.
As highlighted above, Chinese state policies have decisively moved the country away from socialism; in fact, they have led to the restoration of capitalism. And, precisely because China's own elites are committed to building capitalism (with Chinese characteristics), China (as currently organized) cannot be counted on to assist in, much less anchor, the creation of a new economic system or set of international trading or financial relationships. In fact, growing numbers of Chinese workers are beginning to challenge Chinese state policies, not just in response to the exploitation they experience but also because of their renewed interest in socialism itself. Given the enormous importance of China, as a growing economic power and development model, it has become absolutely essential to clarify the nature of the experience there, both to provide support for those seeking socialist renewal in China and to ensure that efforts in other countries are not compromised by false understandings of the dangers of markets and capitalist imperatives. 
